Systems and methods for causing nonpredictable environment states for exploit prevention and malicious code neutralization for JavaScript-enabled applications

ABSTRACT

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for cybersecurity are disclosed. The systems and methods may involve receiving, by an application capable of JavaScript execution, code for execution; executing, before execution of the received code, an intercepting code, wherein the intercepting code is configured to intercept at least one application programming interface (API) invocation by the received code; intercepting, by the intercepting code, an API invocation by the received code; determining that the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulation of a backing store object; and modifying an execution of the intercepted API invocation, wherein the modified execution results in a nonpredictable environment state.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.17/575,286, filed on Jan. 13, 2022, which is a continuation ofInternational Application No. PCT/IL2021/051062, filed on Aug. 31, 2021,which claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No.63/072,581, filed on Aug. 31, 2020. The disclosures of theabove-referenced applications are expressly incorporated herein byreference in their entireties.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to the field of cyber defense, and morespecifically to browser and other JavaScript enabled applicationsexploit prevention and malicious code neutralization

BACKGROUND

Typically, cyber-attackers employ unknown advanced malware and zero-dayvulnerabilities exploits. Most existing, cyber defense technologies relyheavily on signature-based detection for known threats, or signaturelesstechnologies, such as static Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) tactics ordynamic approaches such as machine learning-enabled behavioral andanomaly analytics, sandboxing, and deception. Even more advancedsolutions are enabled by different Moving Target Defense (MTD) tactics.

However, most current cyber defense techniques practically fail toprevent, protect or even detect and remediate most of the advancedthreats, as malicious players employ state-of-the-art evasivetechniques, and keep a step ahead in this cat and mouse game.

Furthermore, in the last few years, browsers, JavaScript engines, andother applications using JavaScript (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.)have become much more sophisticated, and this segment is expected togrow even further, as web applications become more and more common.Increasing levels of sophistication of applications require additionalcode to implement each new feature, which in turn increases the numberof potential vulnerabilities and risk of malicious attacks.

Of the common JavaScript applications, web browsers are the most commonattack targets. Known solutions for browser exploits exist at theoperating system (OS) level, and thus must monitor browser processesfrom the OS level in order to detect malicious behavior. This approachhas a significant flaw, as the ability to monitor and understand thehigh-level JavaScript logic of the browser, from a lower level, islimited. In addition, restricted devices, such as smart TVs,smartphones, and the like, cannot run those OS-level solutions, whichfurther increases the prevalence of the browser as an attack vector.Accordingly, implementation of a cyber-defense solution at theJavaScript application level is of significant value.

The foregoing examples of the related art and limitations relatedtherewith are intended to be illustrative and not exclusive. Otherlimitations of the related art will become apparent to those of skill inthe art upon a reading of the specification and a study of the figures.

SUMMARY

The following embodiments and aspects thereof are described andillustrated in conjunction with systems, tools and methods which aremeant to be exemplary and illustrative, not limiting in scope.

There is provided, in an embodiment, a system comprising at least onehardware processor; and a non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium having stored thereon program instructions, the programinstructions executable by the at least: one hardware processor to:receive, by an application capable of JavaScript execution, a code forexecution, inject, before the execution, an intercepting code into thereceived code, wherein the intercepting code is configured to interceptall application programming it (API) invocations by the received code,intercept, by the intercepting code, an API invocation by the receivedcode, determine that the intercepted API invocation, and results in amanipulation of a backing store object, and modify an execution of theintercepted API invocation, wherein the modified execution results in anon-predictable memory layout.

There is also provided, in an embodiment, a computer-implemented methodcomprising: receiving, by an application capable of JavaScriptexecution, a code for execution; injecting, before the execution, anintercepting code into the received code, wherein the intercepting codeis configured to intercept all application programming interface (API)invocations by the received code; intercepting, by the interceptingcode, an API invocation by the received code; determining that theintercepted API invocation, and results in a manipulation of a backingstore object; and modifying an execution of the intercepted APIinvocation, wherein the modified execution results in a non-predictablememory layout.

There is further provided, in an embodiment, a computer program productcomprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium havingprogram instructions embodied therewith, the program instructionsexecutable by at least one hardware processor to: receive, by anapplication capable of JavaScript execution, a code for execution,inject, before the execution, an intercepting code into the receivedcode, wherein the intercepting code is configured to intercept allapplication programming interface (API) invocations by the receivedcode, intercept, by the intercepting code, an API invocation by thereceived code, determine that the intercepted API invocation, andresults in a manipulation of a backing store object, and modify anexecution of the intercepted API invocation, wherein the modifiedexecution results in a non-predictable memory layout.

In some embodiments, the program instructions are further executable tostore a mapping of the modified execution, and use the mapping torespond to read or write operations by the intercepted API. In someembodiments, the method further comprises storing a mapping of themodified execution, and using the mapping to respond to read or writeoperations by the intercepted API

In some embodiments, the injecting is performed by at least one of: aproxy server, a browser extension, and a privileged operating systemagent.

In some embodiments, the application is a web browser, and the receivedcode is a webpage.

In some embodiments, the modifying comprises at least one of: (i)encoding at least some randomly selected arguments in input dataassociated with the API invocation; (ii) dividing the input data into arandom number of execution contexts; (iii) splitting the input data intoa random number of subsets of the input data; (iv) padding at least somerandomly selected arguments in the input data with random data of thesame type; (v) adding a random number of inline properties to the inputdata, wherein the properties are as non-enumerable with a Symbol as theproperty key: (vi) allocating a random number of additional backingstore objects.

In some embodiments, the at least some of the execution contexts areinline frames.

In some embodiments, the intercepted API invocation comprises creating anew JavaScript object, and wherein the dividing comprises: (i) splittingthe input data into a random number of subsets of the input data; and(ii) creating, for each of the subsets, a separate the object within oneof the different execution contexts.

In some embodiments, the intercepted API invocation comprises creating anew array object, wherein the input data comprises arguments associatedwith the array object, and wherein the dividing comprises: (i) splittingthe input data into a random number of subsets of the input data; and(ii) creating, for each of the subsets, a separate array object withinone of the different execution context.

In some embodiments, the mapping includes a location of each of thearguments within the different execution contexts.

In some embodiments, the intercepting comprises intercepting APIinvocations from all available execution contexts associated with theexecution.

In some embodiments, the mapping comprises a reference to a location ofeach of the objects, and wherein the reference is freed upon theoccurrence of a specified condition.

In some embodiments, the responding is performed by a proxy object.

In addition to the exemplary aspects and embodiments described above,further aspects and embodiments will become apparent by reference to thefigures and by study of the following detailed description.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

Exemplary embodiments are illustrated in referenced figures. Dimensionsof components and features shown in the figures are generally chosen forconvenience and clarity of presentation and are not necessarily shown toscale. The figures are listed below.

FIG. 1 depicts components of a computer system and browser environment,in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of system for patching native APIs andintercepting and manipulating of patched APIs invocations, in accordancewith some embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 3 depicts a flowchart of an example method for protecting acomputer system from vulnerabilities exploitations/malicious processes,in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIGS. 4A-4D are a flowchart illustrating a method for chaoticmanipulation of input data in the case of JavaScript object creation, inaccordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIGS. 5A-5C show a process of adding inline properties to a JavaScriptobject, schematic depiction of a simple JavaScript object, in accordancewith some embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIGS. 6A-6B FIGS. 6A-6B schematically depict random memory allocationmanipulation, in accordance with some embodiments of the presentdisclosure; and

FIG. 7 depicts a flowchart of an example method for manipulating inputdata and splitting context, in accordance with some embodiments of thepresent disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Disclosed herein is a technique, embodied in a system, method, andcomputer program product, for automated neutralizing of malicious codein a computer system. In some embodiments, the present disclosureprovides for various approaches for exploit prevention and maliciouscode neutralization.

Typically, a malicious code, trying to exploit some sort ofvulnerability in the browser, first needs to trigger the vulnerability,and then construct the necessary artifacts for successful exploitation,which in most cases is reflected in achieving code execution.

Typically, browser vulnerability exploitations—and especially thoseattempting to circumvent exploit mitigation techniques, such as addressspace layout randomization (ASLR) and/or data execution prevention(DEP)—require carefully constructed payloads, both for vulnerabilitytriggering and for further exploitation. The most common artifactemployed by browser exploits is the use of JavaScript (JS) typed arrayobjects. The exploitation process thus depends heavily on thepredictable behavior of application programming interfaces (APIs). Forexample, a given exploit may create an array to hold its shellcodepayload pending execution. Under normal conditions, the array creationprocess results in predictable behavior, which means that the createdarray will hold its corresponding backstage JsArray object with apredictable offset between its nodes, or with predictable propertiessuch as array length and/or type.

Accordingly, in some embodiments, the present disclosure provides formanipulating API invocations of the JavaScript engine, in JavaScriptenabled applications, so that the effect of the original API calls onthe underlying memory layout will be unpredictable. As an exemplaryresult, the present technique will cause an object created by maliciouscode to reside in unpredictable memory locations, within multipleexecution contexts; have varying random properties, such as lengthand/or random node ordering, and/or other inline properties, such asrandom strings, random interrupts, INT3 instructions, and the like. Insome embodiments, the present technique may provide for additionalmanipulations of the code, e.g., padding and/or encoding of the payload.

It is noted that the manipulated, or “chaotic” execution approach of thepresent disclosure applies to all executable code, legitimate andmalicious alike. However, the chaotic execution prevents any maliciouscode that relies on the predictable behavior of API invocations fromfulfilling its malicious intent. At the same time, because the presentdisclosure generates and stores a mapping between the original andmanipulated, “chaotic,” execution parameters, to enable the presenttechnique to return the intended values of all read operations of theinput code. Thus, the present disclosure enables legitimate code toexecute as intended.

In some embodiments, in order for API invocations to be manipulated, allnative APIs are patched to enable their interception. Manipulation ispreferably performed only on invocations that are used to create and/ormanipulate back store objects. Manipulation is preferably performed in arandomized “chaotic” manner, and a mapping is generated and storedbetween the original and manipulated object. This way, valid code mayrefer to the mapping to get the intended values for all read/writeoperations, while malicious code that cannot rely, due to themanipulation, on a predictable memory layout/stored payload data, isneutralized as almost any vulnerability will not be triggered and anymalicious payload will not execute.

In particular, a method in computing device is described herein. Themethod includes injecting JavaScript agent (JSA) to a code, prior to, orupon, its receipt by an application capable of JavaScript execution;patching of all exposed native APIs on the application; intercepting allnative API calls invoked by any JavaScript code in the current executioncontext; manipulating those of the intercepted API calls that are usedfor back store allocation and/or manipulation of user-controlled input,in a chaotic randomized manner, so that the effect of the original APIcall on the underlying memory layout/stored data will be unpredictable;generating and storing a mapping between the original and manipulatedparameters; and using the generated mapping to respond and return theintended values to read/write operations by the intercepted API calls,so that complete functionality for the high-level code is maintained,while any code that relies on a predictable behavior of the processmemory layout fails to fulfill any malicious intent. In someembodiments, the present disclosure may further create a proxy objectthat is returned to the original invocation and use the mapping torespond and return the intended value to read operations by theintercepted API calls so that complete functionality for the high-levelcode is maintained.

In one embodiment of the present method, the injection of the JSA may beperformed by any means, for example, using:

-   -   A proxy (on premise/off premise-cloud based);    -   browser extension;    -   privileged OS agent; or    -   as a package for a node.js project.

In one embodiment of the present disclosure, the application is a webbrowser and at least some of the received code is a web page. In oneembodiment of the present disclosure, the manipulation of input data mayinclude different methods, including any combination of one or more ofthe following actions:

-   -   Encoding at least some randomly-selected arguments in the input        data;    -   dividing the input data into a random number of execution        contexts (e.g., inline frames, objects, augmented execution);    -   splitting the input data into a random number of subsets of the        input data; and/or    -   padding at least some randomly selected arguments in the input        data with random data of the same type.    -   storing object references by the JSA, such that the reference to        that object will not be freed and the garbage collector will not        collect it.    -   adding inline properties to the created object, for example,        adding a random number of properties containing primitive        values, and set as non-enumerable with a Symbol as the property        key. For example, object “o” may be defined with a random Symbol        as a property key, and a value equal to some_primitive (e.g.,        10101010). The object descriptor may be set to non-enumerable        and non-configurable, which will result in the direct        manipulation of the backing store object in a way that will        create an unpredictable variant. FIGS. 5A-5B show a schematic        depiction of a simple JavaScript object {a: “foo”, b: “bar”}.        This object has two named properties, “a” and “b,” and two        elements or array-indexed properties: 0, with the value “foo”,        and 1, with the value “bar.” FIG. 5B schematically depicts the        HiddenClasses and DescriptorArrays. The HiddenClass stores meta        information about an object, including the number of properties        on the object and a reference to the object's prototype.        HiddenClasses are created on the fly and updated dynamically as        objects change. HiddenClasses serve as an identifier for the        shape of an object and as such a very important ingredient for        V8's optimizing compiler and inline caches. FIG. 5C depicts the        addition of a property to the JavaScript object (e.g., c:        “baz”). Every time a new property is added, the object's        HiddenClass is changed. A transition tree is created in the        background, which links the HiddenClasses together.    -   randomly allocating new backing store objects in the memory,        wherein each object contains a random number of properties and        random length primitives, which result in a more robust        “chaotic” memory allocation behavior for the underline        JavaScript engine. For example, if a given code creates a new        array object [new_Array(100)], JSA 146 will allocate, before the        actual allocation of the target object, a random number of        randomly-created objects. After memory allocation of the target        object, the same will occur, such that the memory allocations        behavior of the JavaScript engine becomes even more “chaotic.”        FIGS. 6A-6B schematically depict this random memory allocation        manipulation. In FIG. 6A, during normal execution, the allocator        behivor is predictable, which means that if the address for        array “arr1” is known, it may be used to determine the addresses        for other array objects arr2, arr3, arr4, etc. conversely, as        can be seen in FIG. 6B, during random memory allocation, a        random amount of our objects may be allocated, which will make        the allocator behavior unpredictable. In some embodiments, JSA        146 may allocate a stack of multiple native objects and will be        stored internally, such that later on, if a given code tries to        allocate an object with the same type stored in the internal        stack, this object may be returned instead of allocating a new        object, which has the result of further making the allocator        behavior unpredictable.

In one embodiment, at least some of the execution contexts are inlineframes. In one embodiment of the present disclosure, intercepting APIcalls includes creating a new JavaScript object, and the manipulationcomprises:

-   -   Splitting and rearranging arguments into random subsets of        arguments; and    -   creating, for each of the subsets, a separate object within one        of the different execution contexts.

In one embodiment of the present disclosure, intercepting an API callincludes generating a new array object, wherein the input data includesarguments associated with the array object, and wherein the manipulationincludes:

-   -   Splitting and rearranging the arguments into random subsets of        arguments; and    -   generating, for each of the subsets, a separate array object        within one of the different execution contexts.

In one embodiment of the present disclosure, the mapping includes alocation of each of the arguments within the different executioncontexts. In one embodiment of the present disclosure, intercepting APIcalls includes intercepting API invocations from all available executioncontexts associated with the execution. In one embodiment of the presentdisclosure, the mapping includes a reference to a location of each ofthe objects, wherein the reference is freed in a completely randommanner based our a unique seed upon the occurrence of a specifiedcondition.

As indicated above, JavaScript exploits follow certain common patterns.The exploit writer typically attempts to build abstract primitives whichgrant freedom in corrupting memory, e.g., by gaining out-of-bounds (OOB)memory access and/or allowing to read or write data at the processmemory address space. However, by creating a chaotic executionenvironment, the present method thwarts this ability, and the intendedpurpose of the malicious code cannot be effected. Specifically, becausemost if not all of these exploits rely on generating objects (e.g.,arrays), storing raw byte code in memory, and/or fleeing objects underspecific conditions, by executing the API invocations in a chaotic andunpredictable manner, an attacker cannot rely on the results of thegenerated objects, and thus cannot carry out the attack as intended.

For example, in the case of a JavaScript typed array allocation using arelevant JavaScript API (an action that almost all browser exploits usewhen exploiting memory corruption), an attacker may rely on the layoutof the allocated object for successful exploitation. Thus, in order tocreate a chaotic execution environment using the browser API,embodiments of the present disclosure provide for creating multipleexecution contexts (e.g., via multiple inline frame objects), in a waythat causes the browser to allocate multiple memory sections for themultiple contexts. Thus, when the executed code invokes the relevantJavaScript API (e.g., an array constructor) to allocate a new array, thepresent software agent (JSA) intercepts the invocation, and splits allof the original invocation arguments randomly into multiple arrayscorresponding to the multiple execution contexts. In some embodiments,each argument may also be processed by, e.g., data padding, encoding,and/or otherwise. In one embodiment of the present disclosure, in thecase of a malicious exploit code trying to allocate an array to hold itsshellcode for further exploitation, the shellcode ends up residing inmemory scattered across multiple different execution contexts while alsobeing encoded with a random key, and thus prevented from executing itsintended.

In another embodiment of the present disclosure, the method may preventmalicious code attempts to perform a buffer-overflow attack. Bufferoverflow attacks occur when an attacker provides malformed input to aprogram that causes it to write the input incorrectly, to areas outsidethe allotted memory location. Direct overflow attacks try to overwritethe return pointer on the stack, and indirect attacks try to overwrite afunction pointer on the heap that is later dereferenced. In this regard,JavaScript has a built-in “garbage collector” which controls all memorymanagement. Thus, many browser vulnerabilities involve garbage collectormemory management (e.g., use-after-free exploits). For example, amalicious code may try to exploit a use-after-free vulnerability in anOrinoco garbage collector for Chrome, by creating a special object thatwill be freed under special conditions by the garbage collector, andlater accessed by the malicious code to trigger the vulnerability. Usingthe present method, this scenario will be impossible to execute, becauseeach API trying to create any object is intercepted and executed in achaotic manner, with the reference held by the present software agentmapping function. Thus, the malicious code would not be able to triggerthe vulnerability, because the reference to that object will still beheld rather than freed, and the garbage collector will not collect it.

In some embodiment of the present disclosure, it is performed in realtime with no disruption or impact on performance and with no or minimallatency in the execution of the code and/or any program executing on thecomputer system, and in a way that cannot be discovered by the attacker.

In some embodiments of the present disclosure, it does not requiremalicious code detection in order to operate, and is performed withoutregard to whether the content received may be suspicious or not, andwithout the need for applying malware detection algorithms.

In one embodiment of the present disclosure, it is useful for restricteddevices, due to the fact that it operates on the application levelwithout the need to gain access to the OS.

Malicious code or malicious content, as these terms are used throughoutthis disclosure, refers to any content, code, or computer programinstructions intended for a malicious purpose, such as exploit code.Malicious code may be configured to perform any surreptitious ormalicious task, in a way unwanted and unknown to a user, including, forexample, taking control of a computer, obtaining data from a computer,and the like.

In some embodiments, the disclosed methods may be implemented withrespect to any content included in a file or any other received content,without regard to whether the content itself is deemed suspicious inadvance of the present method being performed.

In some embodiments, however, one or more malware detection techniquesmay be implemented together with the exemplary embodiments inassociation with receiving received content and generating modifiedreceived content, but knowledge or awareness of suspected malicious orsuspicious content is not required to disarm any malicious content thatmay be included in the received content.

Received content according to the disclosed embodiments may include anyform of electronic content, including any file or other objects that maybe downloaded, run, processed, opened, or executed by an application oroperating system of the victim computer or computing device. Maliciouscontent may be embedded among seemingly legitimate content. A fileaccording to the disclosed embodiments may include any file or file-likecontent, such as an embedded object or script, that is processed, run,opened or executed by an application of a computing system. In someembodiments, the present disclosure provides a chaotic executionenvironment generating engine configured to run within a JavaScriptenvironment.

A system is also described herein, configured to employ the methoddescribed herein. The system includes one or more processing units and amemory coupled with one or more processing units. The memory storesprogram code for execution by one or more processing units. The programcode includes a JavaScript agent, including several modules: a pitcherconfigured to patch all exposed native APIs of current executioncontext, and a controller configured to intercept all API invocation ofthe wrapped APIs, and to further identify API invocations that are usedfor backing store allocation and/or manipulations of user-controlledinput, and further refer these API invocation to a chaotic engineconfigured to manipulate the altering invocations—splitting andrearranging in few subsets, encoding, identifying the type of arguments,padding and diverting the manipulated invocation to multiple differentcontexts.

The controller is further configured to store a mapping between theoriginal and manipulated object and to generate values to be returned tothe original invocation, using the mapping, so that completefunctionality for the high-level code is maintained; while any code thatrelies on a predictable behavior of the process memory layout, fails tofulfill any malicious intent. A computer program product including anon-transitory computer-readable storage medium having program codeembodied therewith, the program code executable by at least one hardwareprocessor to perform the method described herein. Example Systems andMethods for exploit prevention and neutralizing malicious code

FIG. 1 depicts components of a computer system 100, in accordance withsome embodiments, that prevent exploitations and neutralizes theexecution of malicious code associated with a computing processexecuting thereon.

Computer system 100 includes at least one hardware processor 102, atleast one secondary storage device 104, network hardware 106, mainmemory 110, and communication infrastructure 108 interconnecting all theabove.

System 100 may store in a non-volatile memory thereof, such as mainmemory 110 or another storage device, program instructions or componentsconfigured to operate hardware processor 102. In some embodiments, thesoftware components may include an operating system, including varioussoftware components and/or drivers for controlling and managing generalsystem tasks (e.g., memory management, storage device control, powermanagement, etc.) and facilitating communication between varioushardware and software components. The program instructions may includeone or more software modules, such as JavaScript Agent (JSA) 146 and/orinitializer 150.

Main memory 110 may be segmented into user space 112 and kernel space114. Kernel space 114 may be reserved for storing and running operatingsystem 116, and user space 112 may store and run application processes,such as browser process 120.

When a request is made by a browser for a web page, the request istransferred from the browser to the network stack 140, to networkhardware driver 118, to network hardware 106, and the transferred toworld-wide web 144, reaching target web server 142. The web page,including an external executable JavaScript code (input code), isreceived by the browser through network stack 140 and a browser process120 initiated by the browser.

JavaScript engine 130 may then initiate an execution context 132. Theweb page is rendered 122, by different elements of the browser engine(e.g., HTML parser 126, CSS parser 128), and the JavaScript code isreferred for execution by the JavaScript engine 130 (for example, V8 inchrome). The JavaScript Engine native APIs 134 may be invoked by a giveninput code with arguments for generation of a new Array. A native arrayconstructor may be invoked, and creates a new array and fills it withthe provided arguments in a predictable manner.

JavaScript engine 130 then generates the corresponding backing storearray object (jsArray) 138 within process memory 136, and initializes itwith the supplied arguments.

The API invocation returns the newly-generated array object with theinitialized arguments. This predictable behavior, which means that thisarray holds its corresponding backing store jsArray object 138, with apredictable offset between its nodes and/or predictable properties suchas length and/or type, may enable a given exploit process to generate anarray to hold its shellcode payload before execution, and thus carry outits malicious intent without any hindering.

To prevent such exploit process from executing as intended, embodimentsdescribed herein manipulate certain aspects of JavaScript engine 130during run time.

For example, a received web page may be first encountered by initializer150. Initializer 150, which may be configured to perform one of more ofthe following tasks:

-   -   Detect the current JavaScript environment (e.g., a browser,        another application, a Node.js project, etc.);    -   detect the source of the current context,    -   prepare necessary artifacts, such as random internal nested        execution contexts (iFrames),    -   start the DOM monitoring logic, and/or    -   initiate the JavaScript Agent (JSA) 146 context logic.

In some embodiments, the received code is then injected, upon or priorto its receipt by the browser, with a JavaScript Agent (JS) 146. Suchinterception and injection may be carried out by a proxy 148, connectedto network 106. JSA 146 is injected at the top of the page/receivedcode, so that it is executed first by the JavaScript engine. JSA 146 maybe configured to identify and patch all native APIs exposed by thecurrent execution environment, before any code is actually executed.Following the patching, JSA 146 may also be configured to intercept allAPI invocations and identify all API invocations associated with inputdata that may result in manipulation of a backing store object. JSA 146may also be configured to further modify the altered APIs in a chaoticmanner, so that the effect of API invocation on the memory layout willbe unpredictable.

At the same time, JSA 146 may be configured to save the new arrangementsto a mapping, and use the mapping to retrieve the original values. Thus,legitimate JavaScript code will work as intended, while any maliciouscode that relies on predictable behavior of process memory layout, failsto fulfil its malicious intent.

System 100 as described herein is only an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention, and in practice may be implemented in hardware only,software only, or a combination of both hardware and software. System100 may have more or fewer components and modules than shown, maycombine two or more of the components, or may have a differentconfiguration or arrangement of the components. System 100 may includeany additional component enabling it to function as an operable computersystem, such as a motherboard, data busses, power supply, a networkinterface card, etc. (not shown). Moreover, components of system 100 maybe co-located or distributed, or the system may be configured to rim asone or more cloud computing “instances,” “containers,” “virtualmachines,” or other types of encapsulated software applications, asknown in the art.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary execution process 200 forpatching of native APIs and interception and manipulation of patched APIinvocations, in accordance with some embodiments of the presentdisclosure. An application 201 capable of JavaScript execution receivescode 202 for execution. Code 202 is directed to JavaScript Engine 204,for execution. Within execution environment 206, JavaScript Engine 204first executes JavaScript agent (JSA) 146, which was injected to the topof the input code 202 (e.g., a received web page). Thus, in someembodiments, the received code 202 may be injected, upon or prior to itsreceipt by the browser, with JSA 146.

Such interception and injection may be carried out by a proxy 148,connected to network 106. Shown in FIG. 1 . In some embodiments, JSA 146is injected at the top of the page/received code 202, so that it isexecuted first by the JavaScript engine.

In some embodiments, JSA 146 may be configured to identify and patch allnative APIs exposed by the current execution environment, before anycode is actually executed. Thus, in some embodiments, a patcher 146 a,which is a module of JSA 146, identifies and patches all exposed nativeAPIs 220 in the current execution context, before any other code. Thus,from this point onward, all interactions between the received code andthe native APIs are mediated by JSA 146, and any API invocation seesonly the wrapped APIs 222. Thus, all API calls invoked by code 202 areintercepted by wrapped API 222 and referred to a controller 146 b. Insome embodiments, controller 146 b will be invoked on each invocation ofa native API, so as to replace it with the present wrapped API. Based onthe invocation type, controller 146 b may perform at least two of thefollowing actions:

-   -   Serialize invocation parameters for telemetry,    -   invoke the execution control module, and/or    -   transfer control to chaotic engine 146 e, to perform        manipulations, as further detailed below.

In some embodiments, patcher 146 a may be invoked for every executioncontext (e.g., iFrame) within the execution environment. Thus, forexample, at first patcher 146 a will be invoked within the “top”context, as well as within any other nested execution context.

In some embodiments, patcher 146 a may be applied within the twofollowing two main categories:

-   -   Regular native functions, which may also return a new object        instance, and    -   Native constructor functions, which, when called using “new,”        will create a new object instance.

In some embodiments, patcher 146 a is configured to be invoked for everyexecution context, including any “top” context as well as any othernested executing context therein. In some embodiments, when the “top”and any nested execution context are of the same source, patcher 146 apatching module will patch the nested execution context window objectswithin the same execution context, i.e., without the need forre-executing the JSA in the nested execution context. However, in caseswhere the nested execution context is from a different source, e.g.,“cross origin,” initializer 150 will re-inject the JSA in the nestedexecution context.

In some embodiments, patcher 146 a will iterate on the vast majority ofthe native exposed APIs, and will replace the original native APIs withthe present wrapped APIs, wherein the wrapped APIs will invokecontroller 146 b on each invocation.

In some embodiments, patcher 146 a may operate within two maincategories:

-   -   Regular native functions, which may also return a new object        instance, and/or    -   native constructor functions, which, when called using “new,”        will create a new object instance.

In some embodiments, the present disclosure provides for furthermanipulations to ensure that the present wrapped APIs may not bedetected, while maintaining full functionality. Thus, for example, thepresent disclosure may provide for storing, with respect to each wrappedAPI, in a special key-value mapping 146 d, the wrapped API as the keyand the original native API as the value. This may facilitate thelocating of the native API based on the wrapped API, and allow thepresent disclosure to return the expected values for operations on thewrapped API, as shall further be explained below. For example:

-   -   * someFunc.toString( ) should return the string representation        of a function, and in the case of a native function, it will        return—“function Array( ){[native code]}” (for Array native).    -   someFunc.length indicates the number of parameters expected by        the function.    -   someFunc.name—indicates the function name as specified when it        was created.

All of these should return the expected value for each wrapped API, suchthat with respect to each invocation, the original native API may beretrieved via the mapping 146 d and return the corresponding value forthe native API, to be returned as the expected value. Thus,functionality transparency may be maintained for each of the wrappedAPIs.

In some embodiments, following the patching, JSA 146 may also beconfigured to intercept all API invocations and identify all APIinvocations associated with input data that may result in manipulationof a backing store object. Thus, in some embodiments, controller 146 b,which a module of JSA 146, diverts all API calls associated with inputdata that may result in manipulation of a backing store object, to achaotic engine 146 e, which manipulates the input data, and splits itinto different contexts as it builds the backing store objects. Thisresults in an unpredictable memory layout 226.

A mapping 1464 of the manipulations applied to the API calls isgenerated and stored at controller 146 b, which maps between theoriginal and manipulated execution parameters. In some embodiments, aproxy object 146 c is then created, which may be returned to theoriginal code invocation, wherein the code sees the proxy-object as anarray. All calls to indexes of this proxy object reach controller 146 b,which returns the expected values to such read operations, by usingmapping 1464. All attempts to add more nodes to the array again resultin referring the call to the chaotic engine for manipulation.

Thus, complete functionality for the high-level code is maintained, asthe proxy object returns the expected values for all read operations,while any code that relies on the predictable behavior of the underlyingmemory will fail due to the manipulations used by the process ofgenerating the backing store objects.

Non-altering API invocations, e.g., API calls that are not used for backstoring allocation and/or manipulation of user-controlled input, aredocumented and transferred by the controller 146 b to the native API. Insome embodiments, the controller 146 b may be configured to block suchAPI calls, based, e.g., on enterprise policy, and the like.

The program instructions of JSA 146, shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 , includingits modules patcher 146 a, controller 146 b, proxy object 146 c, map 146d and chaotic engine 146 e, will now be discussed with reference to theflowchart of FIG. 3 , which illustrates the functional steps in a methodfor exploitations prevention and malicious process protection in acomputer system, in accordance with some embodiments of the presentdisclosure.

For illustrative purposes, the flowchart in FIG. 3 is described withcontinued reference to system 100 in FIG. 1 , and execution environment200 in FIG. 2 .

JavaScript Agent (JSA) 146, of FIGS. 1 and 2 , respectively, may operateaccording to the flowchart in FIG. 3 . The different modules of JSA 146shown in FIG. 2 , e.g., patcher 146 a, controller 146 b, proxy object146 c, map 146 d and chaotic engine 146 e, may operate according to theflowchart in FIG. 3 . Wrapped APIs 222 and unpredictable memory layout226, in FIG. 2 , may operate according to the flowchart in FIG. 3 .

In some embodiments, in step 302, a received code may be executed byapplication 201, e.g., a received webpage may be rendered in a browser.

In some embodiments, exposed native APIs in the current executioncontext are identified and patched. For example, with reference to FIG.2 , the program instruction of system 100 may cause patcher 146 a, amodule of JSA 146, to carry out identification and patching of exposednative APIs. At the conclusion of step 302, exposed native APIs 220 maybecome wrapped APIs 222, and are linked to controller 146 b.

In some embodiments, in step 304, the program instruction of system 100may cause controller 146 b, a module of JSA 146, to intercept all APIinvocations, which are now patched to wrapped APIs 222.

In some embodiments, controller 146 b may be configured to intercepteach invocation of a native API, and to replace is with wrapped APIs222.

For example, in FIG. 2 , all invocations of wrapped APIs 222 areintercepted and referred to controller 146 b. In some embodiments,controller 146 b may be configured to intercept all API invocations. Insome embodiments, controller 146 b may be configured to intercept onlyAPI invocations which comprise input data or values, e.g., arrayarguments, from an untrusted source. In some embodiments, interceptedAPI invocations are only those comprising ‘exposed’ APIs, i.e., thosewhich may result in a backing store allocation. In some embodiments,‘exposed’ APIs may be detected by JSA 146 in real time, duringexecution. In some embodiments, exposed APIs may be detected based on apredetermined list of APIs. Examples of such APIs are any APIs which maybe used for storing and/or manipulating input arguments from athird-party, which may include, but are not limited to, Array( )constructor, Object constructors, typed arrays, Array Buffer,collections, Atomics, DataView, etc.

In some embodiments, in step 306, those of the intercepted APIinvocations that are associated with input data that may result inmanipulation of a backing store object, are identified and referred formanipulation. For example, with reference to FIG. 2 , the programinstruction of system 100 may cause controller 146 b to perform thisprocess of identification.

In some embodiments, in step 308, the program instruction of system 100may cause chaotic engine 146 e, a module of JSA 146, to perform chaoticmanipulation of a referred API invocation. In some embodiments, suchmanipulation comprises any combination of one or more of the following:

-   -   Splitting of arguments into subsets, and rearranging the split        arguments in different argument subsets;    -   encoding input arguments or argument subsets with, e.g., a        runtime generated key unique for each API invocation. In some        cases, a different encryption key may be generated for each        argument;    -   Inserting random padding of the same type as the argument in one        or more of the arguments or argument subsets; and/or    -   diverting of manipulated data to multiple different execution        contexts.

For example, with reference to FIG. 2 , such manipulation may beperformed by chaotic engine 146 e, a module of JSA 146. In someembodiments, chaotic execution may comprise a random selection and/orcombination of any of the above-listed actions, e.g., splitting,encoding, padding, and/or diverting into different execution contexts.

In some embodiments, all the above-mentioned manipulation methods may beperformed in a random manner. For example, splitting arguments intosubsets may be done randomly, whereas the number of subsets and theirlengths selected by JSA 146, e.g., by chaotic engine 146 e, at random.In another example, the above steps of splitting to argument subsets,padding, and diverting into different execution contexts may beperformed by chaotic engine 146 e.

This disclosure will discuss extensively the example of a chaoticexecution of JavaScript array objects creation and their execution in achaotic environment of the present disclosure. However, array objectsare only one example of objects which may be created and/or utilized byAPI invocations and may result is backing store allocation. Other,additional, and/or similar JavaScript objects and their associated APIinvocation and/or other service calls may be similarly executed within achaotic execution environment, and thus result in unpredictable and/orunknowable layout of the process memory.

FIG. 4A is a schematic illustration of an object creation process, inthis case, declaring a new variable using the declaration jar, andassigning to it an array 402 comprising the arguments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 8, using the simpleArray method. This formulation invokes the nativeJavaScript array creator API which will now attempt to create the arraywith the supplied arguments. The array creation typically results in abacking store allocation by the JavaScript interpreter of memoryaddresses to store the created array.

In some embodiments, the input argument may be divided or split into aplurality of splits or subsets. In some embodiments, the number ofsplits may be randomly selected by JSA 146, e.g., by chaotic engine 146e. In some embodiments, the split in performed in a random and arbitrarymanner, wherein the number of subsets and their length in selected byJSA 146 e.g., by chaotic engine 146 e, at random.

As can be seen in FIG. 4A, the arguments are split into 3 subsets 402a-402 c:

-   -   Subset 1: 1,4,6.    -   Subset 2: 2,8,7.    -   Subset 3: 3,5.

In some embodiments, JSA 146, e.g., chaotic engine 146 e, may furtherperform one or more of the following with respect to one or more for thesplits:

-   -   Encoding one or more of the subsets 402 a-402 c using any        hashing or encryption method;    -   determining a type of arguments (e.g., integer, string);    -   padding the data in one or more of subsets 402 a-402 c with        random data of the same type (as can be seen in FIG. 4B). The        type, size, and placing of the padding data may be selected        randomly by JSA 146, e.g., by chaotic engine 146.

FIG. 4B describes the padding, process of the data, in subsets 402 a-402c, with random data of the same type. Such padding is performed onlyafter determining a type of arguments (e.g., integer, string). Thus, forexample, in subset 402 a, the string 00 may be inserted. Similarly, insubset 402 b, the strings 0 and 00 may be inserted, and in subset 402 c,the strings 00 and 00 may be inserted.

FIG. 4C describes generating separate execution contexts for each of thesplit subsets 402 a-402 c. With reference to FIG. 4C, in someembodiments, in the case of array objects, the software agent may createa new array based on each subset 402 a-402 c in each execution context.Thus, the chaotic execution environment results in creating 3 arrays(Context1.Array, Context2.Array, and Context3.Array), each in a separatecontext.

In some embodiments, in the case of a web browser, JSA 146, e.g.,chaotic engine 146 e, may generate different inline frames (IFrames) fordifferent contexts. An execution context may be understood as a wrapperobject, which holds key details for processing a given method, such asvariable object, window object, event queue, scope chain, etc. Forcing aweb browser to create new iframes generates a new execution context foreach split subset 402 a-402 c.

With reference back to FIG. 3 , in some embodiments, in step 310, theprogram instruction of system 100 may cause JSA 146 to generate andstore a mapping 146 d of the associations between subsets 402 a-402 cand the different memory locations and execution contexts. Mapping 146 dmay be generated and stored to map between the original and manipulatedobjects. For example, in FIG. 2 , such mapping 146 d may be generatedand stored by chaotic engine 146 e at controller 146 b. In someembodiments, the mapping includes a location of each of the subsets ofarguments within the multiple arrays. In some embodiments, the mappingstores information with respect to any chaotic execution actions and/ormanipulations performed with respect to an intercepted API, e.g.,splitting, encoding, padding, and diverting.

For example, with reference to FIG. 4C, an exemplary location mapping146 d may comprise the following elements:

-   -   The location of the argument with index 0 (value=1) created in        array 402 in FIG. 4A may be designated as argument index 0        within Inner_Object1:        simpleArray[0]→(Inner_Object1 [0])    -   The location of the argument with index 4 (value=5) created in        array 402 may be designated as argument index 3 within        Inner_Object3:        simpleArray[4]→(Inner_Object3 [3])

FIG. 4D shows an exemplary mapping 146 d according to an exampleembodiment. The exemplary mapping 146 d in FIG. 4D may be used in step312, detailed below, to return the expected values of read operations,wherein expected values may be returned with respect to read/writeoperations using mapping 146 d, so that legitimate code may execute asintended. Thus, for example, any API call to read data from thesupposedly-created array 402 at index 4 will be intercepted by JSA 146,which retrieves the relevant value using the exemplary mapping 146 d.However, the actual simple array 402 does not exist, thus any attempt touse it by the malicious code is frustrated.

In some embodiments, mapping 146 d is configured to maintainfunctionality of the execution environment, in view of the variouschaotic manipulation applied to the executed code. For example, for eachpatched function, mapping 146 d may store in a key-value map the patchedfunction as the key, and the original native as the value. Thus, mapping146 d can enable to efficiently locate the native implementation basedon the patching, and return the expected values for operations on thepatched function. For example:

-   -   The function someFunc.toString( ) should return the string        representation of a function, and in the case of a native        function, it will return “function Array( ){[native code]}” (for        Array native).    -   The function someFunc.length indicates the number of parameters        expected by the function.    -   The function someFunc.name indicates the function's name as        specified when it was created.

With reference back to FIG. 3 , in some embodiments, in step 312, theexpected values with respect to read/write operations are returned tothe original invocation, using the mapping. Thus, legitimate code isexecuted as intended, while any code that relies on the predictablebehavior of the underlying memory fails to fulfill its malicious intent.

In some embodiments, a proxy object may be generated and returned to theinvocation, so that a simple array variable holds this array, and allread operations are intercepted by the proxy object, which uses themapping to retrieve the proper value, decode it, and return to theoriginal invocation. The proxy object described here is an example ofproxy object 146 c in FIG. 2 . For example, with reference to FIG. 2 ,proxy object 146 c may be created by chaotic engine 146 e, and proxyobject 146 c may be linked to mapping 146 d.

The program instructions of JSA 146, shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 , includingits modules patcher 146 a, controller 146 b, proxy object 146 c, mapping146 d and chaotic engine 146 e, will now be discussed with reference tothe flowchart of FIG. 7 , which illustrates the functional steps in amethod for manipulating input data and splitting context in accordancewith some embodiments of the present disclosure.

In some embodiments, in step 702, when an API invocation for simpleArraycreation is intercepted, such interception may be performed by wrappedAPI 222 in FIG. 2 , and is related to step 304 of FIG. 3 .

In step 704, the invocation is identified as altering, i.e., results inbacking store allocation, such identification may be performed bycontroller module 146 b of FIG. 2 and is related to step 306 of FIG. 3 .

In step 706, the arguments of the invocations are encoded.

In step 708, the arguments are split and rearranged into a few groups,such split may be performed by chaotic engine 146 e in FIG. 2 , and isrelated to step 308 of FIG. 3 , and to subsets 402 a-402 c of FIG. 4A.

In step 710, arguments type is checked, and random padding of the sametype is inserted between each argument, such padding may be performed bychaotic engine 146 e of FIG. 2 , and relates to step 308 of FIG. 3 andto FIG. 4B.

In step 712, object references may be stored by JSA 146 such that thereference to that object will not be freed and the garbage collectorwill not collect it. In some embodiments, JSA 146 may also add inlineproperties to the created object, for example, by adding, a randomnumber of properties containing primitive values, and setting them asnon-enumerable with a Symbol as the property key.

In step 714, each argument group may be diverted into different arrayobjects generated in different contexts. Such diversion to differentcontexts may be performed by chaotic engine 146 e of FIG. 2 and relatesto step 308 of FIG. 3 and to FIG. 4C.

In step 716, the new argument location (index and array object) may bestored in a mapping 146 d, such mapping may be performed by chaoticengine 146 e in FIG. 2 , and is an example of mapping 146 d of FIG. 2 ,and an example of the mapping of FIG. 4D.

Finally, in step 718, the expected values with respect to read/writeoperations are returned to the original invocation, using the mapping.Thus, legitimate code is executed as intended, while any code thatrelies on the predictable behavior of the underlying memory fails tofulfill its malicious intent.

In some embodiments, a proxy object may be generated and returned to theinvocation, so that a simple array variable holds this array, and allread operations are intercepted by the proxy object, which uses themapping to retrieve the proper value, decode it, and return to theoriginal invocation. The proxy object described here is an example ofproxy object 146 c in FIG. 2 , and described in step 312 of FIG. 3 .

The present invention may be a computer system, a computer-implementedmethod, and/or a computer program product. The computer program productmay include a computer readable storage medium (or media) havingcomputer readable program instructions thereon for causing a hardwareprocessor to carry out aspects of the present invention.

The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that canretain and store instructions for use by an instruction executiondevice. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but isnot limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device,an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, asemiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of thecomputer readable storage medium includes the following: a portablecomputer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), aread-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROMor Flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portablecompact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD),a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device havinginstructions recorded thereon, and any suitable combination of theforegoing. A computer readable storage medium, as used herein, is not tobe construed as being transitory signals per se, such as radio waves orother freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic wavespropagating through a waveguide or other transmission media (e.g., lightpulses passing through a fiber-optic cable), or electrical signalstransmitted through a wire. Rather, the computer readable storage mediumis a non-transient (i.e., not-volatile) medium.

Computer readable program instructions described herein can bedownloaded to respective computing/processing devices from a computerreadable storage medium or to an external computer or external storagedevice via a network, for example, the Internet, a local area network, awide area network and/or a wireless network. The network may comprisecopper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wirelesstransmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and/oredge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in eachcomputing/processing device receives computer readable programinstructions from the network and forwards the computer readable programinstructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium withinthe respective computing/processing device.

Computer readable program instructions for carrying out operations ofthe present invention may be assembler instructions,instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions,machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions,state-setting data, or either source code or object code written in anycombination of one or more programming languages, including, an objectoriented programming language such as Java, Smalltalk, C++ or the like,and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C”programming language or similar programming languages. The computerreadable program instructions may execute entirely on the user'scomputer, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone softwarepackage, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computeror entirely on the remote computer or server. In the latter scenario,the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through anytype of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide areanetwork (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer(for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider).In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example,programmable logic circuitry, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), ora programmable logic array (PLA) may execute the computer readableprogram instructions by utilizing state information of the computerreadable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuitry,in order to perform aspects of the present invention. In someembodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example, anapplication-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), may be incorporate thecomputer readable program instructions already at time of fabrication,such that the ASIC is configured to execute these instructions withoutprogramming.

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of theinvention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented bycomputer readable program instructions.

These computer readable program instructions may be provided to ahardware processor of a general-purpose computer, special purposecomputer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce amachine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor ofthe computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, createmeans for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchartand/or block diagram block or blocks. These computer readable programinstructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage mediumthat can direct a computer, a programmable data processing apparatus,and/or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that thecomputer readable storage medium having instructions stored thereincomprises an article of manufacture including instructions whichimplement aspects of the function/act specified in the flowchart and/orblock diagram block or blocks.

The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto acomputer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other deviceto cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer,other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computerimplemented process, such that the instructions which execute on thecomputer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement thefunctions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block orblocks.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods, and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in theflowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portionof instructions, which comprises one or more executable instructions forimplementing the specified logical function(s). It will also be notedthat each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, andcombinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchartillustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-basedsystems that perform the specified functions or acts or carry outcombinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.

In the description and claims, each of the terms “substantially,”“essentially,” and forms thereof, when describing a numerical value,means up to a 20% deviation (namely, ±20%) from that value. Similarly,when such a term describes a numerical range, it means up to a 20%broader range—10% over that explicit range and 10% below it).

In the description, any given numerical range should be considered tohave specifically disclosed all the possible subranges as well asindividual numerical values within that range, such that each suchsubrange and individual numerical value constitutes an embodiment of theinvention. This applies regardless of the breadth of the range. Forexample, description of a range of integers from 1 to 6 should beconsidered to have specifically disclosed subranges such as from 1 to 3,from 1 to 4, from 1 to 5, from 2 to 4, from 2 to 6, from 3 to 6, etc.,as well as individual numbers within that range, for example, 1, 4, and6. Similarly, description of a range of fractions, for example from 0.6to 1.1, should be considered to have specifically disclosed subrangessuch as from 0.6 to 0.9, from 0.7 to 1.1, from 0.9 to 1, from 0.8 to0.9, from 0.6 to 1.1, from 1 to 1.1 etc., as well as individual numberswithin that range, for example 0.7, 1, and 1.1.

The descriptions of the various embodiments of the present inventionhave been presented for purposes of illustration, but are not intendedto be exhaustive or limited to the explicit descriptions. Manymodifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skillin the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the describedembodiments. The terminology used herein was chosen to best explain theprinciples of the embodiments, the practical application or technicalimprovement over technologies found in the marketplace, or to enableothers of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodimentsdisclosed herein.

In the description and claims of the application, each of the words“comprise,” “include,” and “have,” as well as fours thereof, are notnecessarily limited to members in a list with which the words may beassociated.

Where there are inconsistencies between the description and any documentincorporated by reference or otherwise relied upon, it is intended thatthe present description controls.

What is claimed is:
 1. A cyber security system comprising: at least oneprocessor configured to: receive, by an application capable ofJavaScript execution, code for execution; execute, before execution ofthe received code, an intercepting code, wherein the intercepting codeis configured to intercept at least one application programminginterface (API) invocation by the received code; intercept, by theintercepting code, an API invocation by the received code; determinethat the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulation of abacking store object; and modify an execution of the intercepted APIinvocation, wherein the modified execution results in a nonpredictableenvironment state and modifying the execution of the intercepted APIinvocation includes at least one of: padding input data associated withthe API invocation; encoding input data associated with the APIinvocation; manipulating input data associated with the API invocation;splitting, into multiple execution contexts, input data associated withthe API invocation; manipulating an object shape associated with the APIinvocation; or manipulating an object structure associated with the APIinvocation.
 2. The cyber security system of claim 1, wherein thenonpredictable environment state includes at least one of anon-predictable memory layout, a non-predictable memory behavior, or anon-predictable property of an object.
 3. The cyber security system ofclaim 1, wherein the intercepting code is configured to patch an exposednative API of a current execution context and intercept an APIinvocation of the patched native API.
 4. The cyber security system ofclaim 1, wherein native API functionality of at least one patched API ismaintained within the nonpredictable environment state.
 5. The cybersecurity system of claim 1, wherein modifying the execution of theintercepted API invocation is performed in response to the determinationthat the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulation of abacking store object.
 6. The cyber security system of claim 1, whereinthe application capable of JavaScript execution is a browser.
 7. Thecyber security system of claim 6, wherein the intercepting code isexecuted by a JavaScript engine associated with the browser.
 8. Acomputer-implemented method for cyber security, the method comprising:receiving, by an application capable of JavaScript execution, code forexecution; executing, before execution of the received code, anintercepting code, wherein the intercepting code is configured tointercept at least one application programming interface (API)invocation by the received code; intercepting, by the intercepting code,an API invocation by the received code; determining that the interceptedAPI invocation results in a manipulation of a backing store object; andmodifying an execution of the intercepted API invocation, wherein themodified execution results in a nonpredictable environment state andmodifying the execution of the intercepted API invocation includes atleast one of: padding input data associated with the API invocation;encoding input data associated with the API invocation; manipulatinginput data associated with the API invocation; splitting, into multipleexecution contexts, input data associated with the API invocation;manipulating an object shape associated with the API invocation; ormanipulating an object structure associated with the API invocation. 9.The computer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein the nonpredictableenvironment state includes at least one of a non-predictable memorylayout, a non-predictable memory behavior, or a non-predictable propertyof an object.
 10. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, whereinthe intercepting code is configured to patch an exposed native API of acurrent execution context and intercept an API invocation of the patchednative API.
 11. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, whereinnative API functionality of at least one patched API is maintainedwithin the nonpredictable environment state.
 12. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein the API invocation isintercepted from at least one available execution context associatedwith the execution of the received code.
 13. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 8, wherein modifying the execution of the interceptedAPI invocation is performed in response to the determination that theintercepted API invocation results in a manipulation of a backing storeobject.
 14. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein theapplication capable of JavaScript execution is a browser.
 15. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the intercepting codeis executed by a JavaScript engine associated with the browser.
 16. Anon-transitory computer-readable medium storing program instructionsexecutable by at least one processor to: receive, by an applicationcapable of JavaScript execution, code for execution; execute, beforeexecution of the received code, an intercepting code, wherein theintercepting code is configured to intercept at least one applicationprogramming interface (API) invocation by the received code; intercept,by the intercepting code, an API invocation by the received code;determine that the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulationof a backing store object; and modify an execution of the interceptedAPI invocation, wherein the modified execution results in anonpredictable environment state and modifying the execution of theintercepted API invocation includes at least one of: padding input dataassociated with the API invocation; encoding input data associated withthe API invocation; manipulating input data associated with the APIinvocation; splitting, into multiple execution contexts, input dataassociated with the API invocation; manipulating an object shapeassociated with the API invocation; or manipulating an object structureassociated with the API invocation.
 17. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 16, wherein the nonpredictableenvironment state includes at least one of a non-predictable memorylayout, a non-predictable memory behavior, or a non-predictable propertyof an object.
 18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim16, wherein the intercepting code is configured to patch an exposednative API of a current execution context and intercept an APIinvocation of the patched native API.
 19. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 16, wherein native API functionalityof at least one patched API is maintained within the nonpredictableenvironment state.
 20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium ofclaim 16, wherein the API invocation is intercepted from at least oneavailable execution context associated with the execution of thereceived code.
 21. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim16, wherein modifying the execution of the intercepted API invocation isperformed in response to the determination that the intercepted APIinvocation results in a manipulation of a backing store object.
 22. Thenon-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16, wherein theapplication capable of JavaScript execution is a browser.
 23. Thenon-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 22, wherein theintercepting code is executed by a JavaScript engine associated with thebrowser.
 24. A cyber security system comprising: at least one processorconfigured to: receive, by an application capable of JavaScriptexecution, code for execution; execute, before execution of the receivedcode, an intercepting code, wherein the intercepting code is configuredto intercept at least one application programming interface (API)invocation by the received code; intercept, by the intercepting code, anAPI invocation by the received code; determine that the intercepted APIinvocation results in a manipulation of a backing store object; andmodify an execution of the intercepted API invocation, wherein themodified execution results in a nonpredictable environment state andmodifying the execution of the intercepted API invocation includes atleast one of: encoding in input data associated with the API invocation,at least some randomly selected arguments; dividing into a random numberof execution contexts, input data associated with the API invocation;splitting into a random number of subsets, input data associated withthe API invocation; padding with random data of a same type as anargument, at least some randomly selected arguments in input dataassociated with the API invocation; adding a random number of inlineproperties to input data associated with the API invocation; allocatingwithin memory a random number of additional backing store objects; orholding at least one object reference in memory in a manner preventingcollection by a garbage collector, and releasing the at least one heldobject reference for garbage collection upon an occurrence of aspecified condition.
 25. A computer-implemented method for cybersecurity, the method comprising: receiving, by an application capable ofJavaScript execution, code for execution; executing, before execution ofthe received code, an intercepting code, wherein the intercepting codeis configured to intercept at least one application programminginterface (API) invocation by the received code; intercepting, by theintercepting code, an API invocation by the received code; determiningthat the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulation of abacking store object; and modifying an execution of the intercepted APIinvocation, wherein the modified execution results in a nonpredictableenvironment state and modifying the execution of the intercepted APIinvocation includes at least one of: encoding in input data associatedwith the API invocation, at least some randomly selected arguments;dividing into a random number of execution contexts, input dataassociated with the API invocation; splitting into a random number ofsubsets, input data associated with the API invocation; padding withrandom data of a same type as an argument, at least some randomlyselected arguments in input data associated with the API invocation;adding a random number of inline properties to input data associatedwith the API invocation; allocating within memory a random number ofadditional backing store objects; or holding at least one objectreference in memory in a manner preventing collection by a garbagecollector, and releasing the at least one held object reference forgarbage collection upon an occurrence of a specified condition.
 26. Anon-transitory computer-readable medium storing program instructionsexecutable by at least one processor to: receive, by an applicationcapable of JavaScript execution, code for execution; execute, beforeexecution of the received code, an intercepting code, wherein theintercepting code is configured to intercept at least one applicationprogramming interface (API) invocation by the received code; intercept,by the intercepting code, an API invocation by the received code;determine that the intercepted API invocation results in a manipulationof a backing store object; and modify an execution of the interceptedAPI invocation, wherein the modified execution results in anonpredictable environment state and modifying the execution of theintercepted API invocation includes at least one of: encoding in inputdata associated with the API invocation, at least some randomly selectedarguments; dividing into a random number of execution contexts, inputdata associated with the API invocation; splitting into a random numberof subsets, input data associated with the API invocation; padding withrandom data of a same type as an argument, at least some randomlyselected arguments in input data associated with the API invocation;adding a random number of inline properties to input data associatedwith the API invocation; allocating within memory a random number ofadditional backing store objects; or holding at least one objectreference in memory in a manner preventing collection by a garbagecollector, and releasing the at least one held object reference forgarbage collection upon an occurrence of a specified condition.